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MID-PASSAGE-THE NAVAJO TRIBE
AND ITS FIRST LEGAL REVOLUTION
Stephen Conn *
Introduction
Scholars who study law as a social process are necessarily con-
cerned with the motivating forces which lead to elaboration of
new institutions, new jobs in law, and new ways of processing
disputes. How is it that law came to be encased in institutions and
the special province of specialists? What figures in the transforma-
tion of dispute adjustment from an unspecial activity on the part
of persons who draw upon the commonly accepted values of the
society to a kind of craft among crafts performed by persons ac-
corded special authority to make their wisdom prevail upon
disbelievers?
Some scholars suggest that law follows society's needs, and "so
long as informal controls work smoothly, societies can do without
formal controls."' Law as a highly structured form of social con-
trol drives out less structured forms of social control tied to ongo-
ing relationships characteristic of primitive, preliterate and simple
societies when those same relationships undergo greater differen-
tiation.2 When societies are simple, law is simple. Legal process is
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1. L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM, A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 99 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as FRIEDMAN].
2. D. BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW 38-40, (1976) [hereinafter cited as BLAcKI.In fact,
Black sees the final impact of differentiation as curvilinear in its impact on the quantity of
legal activity when symbiotic interdependence becomes extreme. Id. One could argue that
the relationship between Indian traders and Navajos provided an early example of sym-
biosis which many attempts at legal intervention by tribal attorneys, poverty lawyers, and
federal agencies could not influence. See Conn & Reichbart, The Trading Post, in VICENTI,
et al., THE LAW OF THE PEOPLE (DINE BIBEE HAZAANII) 64 (1972) [hereinafter cited as VICENTI],
for a portrait of the trader as "the embodiment of the entire market economy: jobs, goods
and sources of credit."
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said then to follow society; when societies become complex, law
becomes complex.3
All elements of every society do not have an equal say in the
definition of law. Some theoreticians place special emphasis on
economic forces as the driving element in the change of legal
systems.' Others focus upon the particular needs of the state to en-
force instrumentally its definitions of appropriate conduct.' But
nearly all students of law in society confirm that the system which
evolves springs from internal disputes which are recognized as
unresolved according to some segment of the society. Law is a
product of a particular society, a product of its allocation of
power, perhaps a product of its definitions of right and wrong, or
at least the product of an element within the society which is in-
strumental in defining for others, problems of societal importance
entitled to resolution in a manner appropriate to at least a portion
of the society. The consumers of law will prevail in directing the
origin, shape, and direction of the law of their society.'
Students of law are rarely on the scene when law emerges. They
must couple their observations to a theory of law in order to
describe the whole of legal process from their own two-
dimensional view of the present.!
if law follows society it must reflect the particular design for liv-
ing outlined by nonlegal expressions and acts of members of the
culture. Friedman concludes, "Each distinctive culture seems to
generate a legal system in its image, one that suits its own style
3. Scholars demonstrate that the regular use of non-kin advocates (counsel) and
specialized norm enforcers (police) join mediation as fixtures of the legal systems in more
complex societies. Schwartz & Miller, Legal Evolution and Societal Complexity, 70 AM.
J.OF SOC. 159 (1964).
4 K. MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1890); WEBER ON LAW IN
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (M. Rheinstein ed. 1925).
5 E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (1893); POUND, THE HISTORY AND
SYSTEM Or THE COMMON LAW (1939).
6 See BLACK, supra note 2, at 139-64; L. NADER, LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY (1969);
Nader, The Ethnology of Law, 67 AM. ANTHR. 6,67 (1965). For an ongoing account of the
literature in the field, see LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW (R. Able ed.) Friedman notes: "Society
can contain and control its conflict and competition, so long as people generally agree
about aims and means what things one may conflict and compete about." FRIEDMAN, supra
note 1, at 145. This is not to say that all legal chance reflects the desires and aspirations of
all consumers. Laura Nader and Harry F. Todd, Jr., suggest that one of the problems "in us-
ing conflicting and changing systems of law, often imported wholesale, often based on an
alien value system," is that "[tihose who often suffer are the preliterate, the illiterate, the
common people closest to urban centers-people whose indigenous systems of law are
sabotaged under pressures for modernization." L. NADER & H. TODD, JR., THE DISPUTING
PROCESS- LAW IN TEN SOCIETIES 2 (1978).
7 M. GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHODESIA
(1955).
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and own needs like a costume cut to specifications."8 Choices
available to a society in the definition of its legal process may not
be as broad as this. Sitting in a modern Navajo court, for example,
and listening to Navajos licensed by a tribal bar examination' offer
arguments to a Navajo judge in a black robe," one can assume that
change in Navajo society dictated this transformation of law by
chapter officers or headmen into law by Anglo-American court
procedure." Within the Navajo communities the assumption is
validated by the number of problems previously dealt with at the
community level and now appearing on a court docket.'2
Glowing reports of the court system, 3 the legal services pro-
gram and the police lead one to assume that the Navajo popula-
tion prevailed upon its elected councilmen to establish this kind of
court, police force and advocacy system.
A study of the history of Navajo law, facilitated by extant
records, suggests that the Navajos did not define their own legal
8. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 142.
9. The first bar examination administered by the court system of the Navajo Nation took
place in December, 1976. Any Navajo or non-Navajo was allowed to take it without regard
to language skills, knowledge of custom, residency, or education attained. The purpose of
the exam was to screen and control those who practiced in tribal court in anticipation of the
court's eventual assumption of jurisdiction over non-Navajos and to protect consumers
from slipshod practitioners. Interviews with Stephen Gudac, General Counsel, Tribal
Court System, Apr. 3, 1977, Window Rock, Ariz. Although this move to professionalize
practitioners took place under circumstances not covered in this paper, the reasons offered
for it are similar to those offered to the Tribal Council for professionalization of the judges
and the police. See text accompanying notes 107, 133 infra.
10. Tribal courts hear violations of the tribe's adopted version of the Federal Law and
Order Code, usually cast as misdemeanors in state courts, civil actions where the defendant
is a Navajo and found within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and domestic relations
cases between Indians. 7 Navajo Tribal Code § 133 (1970). See note 26 infra.
11. There are many excellent studies of Navajo law ways. See, e.g., Van Valkenburgh,
Navajo Common Law, 9 MUSEUM NOTES, MUSEUM OF NORTHERN ARIZONA (Flagstaff), 17-
22, 51-54 (1936), and in Vol. 10, 39-45 (1938); or, for a modern account, M. SHEPARDSON &
E. HAMMOND, THE NAVAjO MOUNTAIN COMMUNITY 128-36 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
SHEPARDSON & HAMMOND].
12. The most recent anthropological study by Shepardson and Hammond, supra note
11, based on fieldwork accomplished in 1961-63, suggested that attempts were made to
resolve matters by mediation between kin or within communities and outside of the courts.
Only some unresolved matters were cast as criminal or civil complaints and reported to
police: "The threat of turning the case over to the Navajo Tribal Court, with its sanctions of
fines, paid not to the injured party but to the impersonal court, and imprisonment, acts as a
strong pressure for agreement." Id. at 131. Shepardson adds that it is a mistake to exag-
gerate the influence of this threat.
Present-day tribal court advocates report that traditional law ways prevail in family and
in land cases, especially in more rural areas of the reservation. Advocates, themselves, are
called upon to handle many intra-familial disputes outside of the court. Interviews with
Daniel Deschinny and Zunie Yellowhair, Apr. 1, 1977, Window Rock, Ariz. [hereinafter
cited as Yellowhair Interview].
13. See, e.g., Judicial Branch of the Navajo Nation, Annual Report (1975).
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system. 4 The specifications were developed and refined in non-
Navajo society. Only in specific instances did the system reflect a
perceived need to treat complex problems then untreatable by the
prevailing system of customary law. It did not reflect a special an-
tipathy by non-Navajos for customary law as barbarism or a
special desire to educate the Navajo population to Anglo-
American law."5 The motivations of the Navajo were tied not to
the reform of the internal relationships between law and problems
within their society, but to the external relationships between their
governmental stucture and the more powerful legal instruments of
the federal government and of the states."
Navajo Development of An Anglo System of Law
From 1948 to 1959, the Navajo Tribe, 7 through its council,"
constructed a large Western-type police and court bureaucracy,
staffed, funded, and identified as tribal. If measured in dollars or
in the number of tribal members who came to work as police or
judges in communities both on the reservation and in Navajo com-
munities on Indian lands, its law system was the clearest and most
independent expression of governmental authority."
14. Transcripts of' Navajo Tribal Council Meetings [hereinafter cited as NTC] are
located in the offices of the area superintendent, Window Rock, Ariz.
15. Contra, Price, Lawyers on the Reservation: Some Implications for the Legal Profes-
sion, ARIz. L.J. 161, 173 (1969).
16. See text accompanying notes 35-47 infra.
1?. The tribe, the largest single group of American Indians (est. 135,000 members)
resides on the 25,000-square-mile reservation in northern Arizona and western New Mex-
ico, as well as on the 3,000-square-mile "checkerboard" of allotted or tribally owned
enclaves denominated off-reservation Navajo communities. In addition, Navajos, not sub-
ject to the law and order services delivered by tribal or federal agencies unless they return to
the reservation or Indian country, live in Anglo border towns and other cities.
18. The Tribal Council was not a fixture of traditional Navajo social organization. It
was created by federal officials to sign oil leases and was viewed for years thereafter as a
rubber stamp for federal officialdom. DOWNS, THE NAVAJO 124 (1972). However, by the
time the issues arose which comprise the focus of this paper, the Council had been
reorganized so that its members were elected from local districts. C. KLUCKHOHN & D:
LEIGHTON, THE NAVAJO [hereinafter cited as KLUCKHOHN & LEIGHTON]. The Council was
still "foreign," but its members were regularly apprised of grassroots opinion as the debates
discussed below will substantiate.
19. The tribe's $8,000 contribution to law and order services in 1952, services delivered
by a small federal agency, became a $1,305,749 contribution nine years later. R. YOUNG,
NAVAJO YEARBOOK 281 (1961) [hereinafter cited as YEARBOOK]. The number of Navajo
police doubled. Id. at 284. The court system was reorganized with a chief judge and ap-
pellate court. Additional funds were expended to refurbish and extend the jail and court
facilities throughout the reservation. New candidates for judgeships were screened for their
competence in English by the Anglo head of the Navajo police department with the
assistance of the Council's law and order committee. SeeDavis, Court Reform in the Nava-
jo Nation, 43 AM. JUD. Soc. (1959); Fahey, Native American Justice: The Courts of the
Navajo Nation, 59 AM. JUD. Soc. (1975); 1958 YEARBOOK, at 141.
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The Navajo Tribe committed limited resources and supplied
tribal personnel to a legal system that was still foreign to the ma-
jority of its members as a vehicle for the resolution of intra-tribal
disputes. The tribe built a police force which by 1957 had arrested
nearly a third of the adult Navajo population on at least one occa-
sion." The Navajo police did not replace soldiers or federal agents
as Navajo police had previously done in the quarter-century after
the return from Fort Sumner. Instead, they expanded the presence
of police power at the hogan level at a time when police were
associated with the infamous stock reduction program and the
earlier seizure of children for removal to distant boarding
schools."
Tribal members undertook the responsibilities of judgeships
within the tribal legal system.' However, these Navajo judges
were criticized for their inability to read and interpret the Federal
Code which had been adopted as the Navajo Code for tribal
courts. The penalties they meted out to defendants were also
disfavored in a system where fines went into tribal coffers and jail
terms were spent in tribal jails.'
This transformation of a small federal activity into a large
Navajo legal system occurred when the federal government had
not formally relinquished its own professed responsibility to pro-
vide law and order services as a means to educate Navajos to
20. 1958 YEARBOOK, supra note 19, at 40.
21. The first police on the Navajo Reservation were soldiers. In fact, the Navajo word
for policeman (silao) is said to be derived from the word for soldier (tsilaso tsol). Some
Navajo headmen saw that their appointment as police would allow them to replace soldiers
and act as a buffer between the people and the government. Indian agents, for their part,
saw police as an extension of their authority to aid in daily tasks and compete with the
military. Although much has been written about the anticultural purposes which prompted
the funding of Indian judges and police, much less stress has been placed on the way that
Navajos exploited the dependence of the agent on his police to convey to him information
about crimes, resolve disputes, and often to punish offenders.
The former theme is well set forth in W. HAGAN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES:
EXPERIMENTATION IN ACCULTURATION AND CONTROL (1966). The latter can be gleaned only
from reports of Indian agents in REPORTS OF THE INDIAN COMMISSIONER 1890-1920 and un-
published notes of R. Van Valkenburg, on file, U.S. Federal Archive, Calif.
Indian agents could not sustain Navajo police because of low wages. Further, the two
tasks of seizing children and seizing sheep were especially hated by police and non-
policemen alike. See W. DYK, OLD MEXICAN: A NAvAJO AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1947), for an ac-
count of one Navajo's refusal to work as a policeman when it meant rounding up children.
The seizure of sheep about thirty years later in an attempt by Indian Commissioner Collier
to institute a program of range management caused the tribe to reject other federal plans for
reorganization under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 476, and to throw
out their Council. COLLIER, FROM EVERY ZENITH 252 (1963) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER].
22. The judge ( "anih will 'aahi) is in Navajo "one who issues punishment."
23. See text accompanying notes 166-187 infra. Navajo Tribal Council Res. CJA-1-59
(Jan. 6, 1959).
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Anglo legal ways." At the operational level, the federal govern-
ment had done little more than mount a symbolic legal system. It
did not educate; neither did it provide services to any meaningful
degree. The federal government in its own right was hardly suc-
cessful in imposing an Anglo-American legal system on the Nava-
jos.z'
The Interior Department and the federal courts were left the
burden of dividing among themselves criminal law misdemeanors
and felonies for Indians.' Congressional appropriations for this
activity were sparse, even when Indian tribes made special appeals
to Washington for help.2"
Termination had become the professed congressional policy for
dealing with Indian groups as cultural minorities. Congress was
prepared to facilitate and to encourage the implantation of state
criminal and civil law systems upon Indians. States could make a
token extension of their court and police systems onto the Indian
reservations with little effort. The dollars involved were not com-
parable to the amount necessary to extend the state educational
system and other services.' Therefore, de jure state jurisdiction
did not necessarily mean de facto police protection or court ser-
vices."
24. At least this was the rationale of these strange fixtures of Indian administration
called "courts" as applied to them by court cases which antedated the first courts on the
Navajo Reservation established by Indian agents in 1892. See United States v. Clapox, 35
Fed. 575 (D.C. Ore. 1888).
25. See note 27 infra. For a survey account of federal law and order administration, see
1 L. MERIAM, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION 757-75 (1928) [hereinafter cited as
MERIAMI.
26. An outraged Congress removed prosecution of serious crimes from the hands of In-
dians when a federal court held in Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), that tribal
justice, in this case remuneration for a killing, was the only penalty to be levied unless Con-
gress said otherwise. The original Seven Major Crimes Act, 23 Stat. 362, 385, placed
murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny in
federal and not tribal courts. The Major Crimes Act as amended 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1964) in-
cludes embezzlement, incest, assault with a deadly weapon, and robbery.
27. See NTC Minutes, Feb. 18, 1947, at 84, for one such futile account. Felonies were
dismissed or fed back into the reservation court system as misdemeanors. For example, 12
or 14 cases presented for prosecution as manslaughter in 1957 -58 were handled in the Court
of Indian Offenses, as were 12 of 14 rape cases, 45 of 48 assaults with a deadly weapon, and
16 of 18 burglaries in the same period. 1958 YEARBOOK, supra note 19, at 350. While at least
one scholar argues that the tribes continue to share jurisdiction over these serious crimes
with the federal government, the decisions of the United States Attorney have created this
situation as a matter of fact. See Davis, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Country in
Arizona, 1 ARIZ. L. REv. 62, 89 (1959).
28. For a survey of health, educational, and law and order problems in the epoch, see
THE PHELPS-STOKEs FUND, THE NAVAJO INDIAN PROBLEM (1939). Problems of working with
rather than for Indians were noted at 123.
29. Seecomments by Billy Becenti, NTC Minutes, Jan. 23, 1953. 543-44.
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Law and order are services typically proffered by a sovereign
entity. The abrasive influence of law, employed as a "weapon of
denial"" had been the foremost lesson for Navajos who sought a
reading of the allocation of power between the tribe, the states,
and the federal government. Law was not merely articulated
policy; law and police power combined constituted the symbolic
demonstration of the power and the authority of the state.3
Navajos were aware that they could lose the inherent powers of
self-government by default. The right to self-government inherent
in Indian semi-sovereign states was subject to reinterpretation by
Congress." Tribal action was essential to prove their capacity to
govern and therefore retain the inherent power.' To govern
within the realm of law and order meant to bring social control to
bear through police and judges. Other forms of social control in-
30. "Law (bee haz' aani) in the Navajo language is distinguished from 'a way of living'
in the religious sense (mahagha) or the way that people think or plan (nahat 'a). Anglo law
is not, then, a code that one addresses himself to when he decides how to act or tells other
people how to act, as it may well be for the middle-class white person .... Thus, while an
Anglo might say to a child seen removing an object from a pick-up, 'Don't do that, Johnny.
That is against the law,' a Navajo might say 'Don't do that son. That is not how to act.'
"Anglo law is best understood by Navajos as the forceful activity of the courts, the police
and others upon whom the authority has been placed. It is descriptively the function of
these institutions. It is not the business of ordinary people." VIcaNrI, supra note 2, at 156-
57.
31. Chee Dodge explained the legal relationship between Navajo people and other
Americans in an address to 2,000 Navajos published in a county newspaper: "The President
has given you a long rope so that you may graze wherever you please. If a man has a good
horse and pickets him out he gives him a long rope in good grass and lets him graze as far as
he can; but if he has a mean horse he gives him a short rope with his head tied close to a
post so he can get but a little feed. The President has given you a long rope. Some of you
have a very long rope; you live very far from the Reservation; others who live nearer the
Reservation have a shorter rope; but the President has a rope on every one of you, and if
you do not appreciate the good treatment you are given, if you try to make trouble, he will
pull on all the ropes and draw you fellows all together in a tight place .... You will lose
your stock and you will be wiped out, and you will be guarded by troops, and everybody
will laugh at you and say 'See what a large tribe this was and this is all that is left of them'."
A. WILLIAMS, THE NAVAJO POLITICAL PROCESS 14 (1970).
32. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 64 (1973); United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375 (1886).
33. Activity by the tribe created for them a strong argument in court and in Congress
that state action would interfere with "the internal and social relations of tribal life," or the
right of Indians to make and be governed by their own laws. A good example of this was
the exemption by Congress of the Red Lake Reservation of Minnesota, the Warm Springs
Reservation of Oregon, and the Menominees of Wisconsin from Public Law 280 because
they had legal systems and organizations "functioning in a reasonably satisfactory man-
ner." S. REP. No. 699, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 6 (1953), cited in Goldberg, Public Law 280:
The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 535-94
(1975). 1 hereinafter cited as Goldberg.) See also Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)
and United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975), cited in Goldberg, "The Prospects for
Navajo Taxation of Non-Indians," Lake Powell Research Project Bull. No. 19, at 19 (Mar.
1976).
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tertwined with lesser institutions of society were perceived then
(as now) as mere anarchy by outsiders.
Navajo Strategy
Retrospective accounts of the Navajo assumption of the legal
system in 1959 ignore critical intermediate decisions which built
and empowered an Anglo legal system that was not tribal or
customary.' One account suggests that the tribe, like one of the
original colonies, responded to pressures by the federal govern-
ment with a "Declaration of Independence" which assumed titular
responsibility for law, courts, and police.' A proclamation of in-
dependence would have been impossible, however, given the con-
tinuing strength of terminationist feeling in Congress and the
capacity of the states to elicit congressional support when tribal
and state interests collided."' The tribe's approach to the problem
of law and order was indirect, and its power to act was finally a
product of indirect rule.'
The tribe first attempted to underwrite and improve those law
and order services in federal hands. The maneuver was largely
defensive, not merely against law violators, but against federal in-
action and state aspirations. The tribal attorney lobbied for and
Congress allowed the tribe to adopt a constitution grounded in an
amalgam of federal and tribal powers."0 The Tribal Council re-
jected this restatement of its authority, just as it had rejected an
earlier opportunity to reorganize as a constitutional entity under
the [ndian Reorganization Act of 1934."
The tribe chose a course of action that relied first upon fleshing
out police and courts under federal control. Only when the limits
of this approach had been reached did it take over the legal
34. BLAcK, supra note 2, at 2.
35. See 0. ONLEY & D. GETCHES, INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE 2 n.39 (1978).
36. See, 'Equal Protection of the La w'Sought by the Tribal Judicial Department, Navajo
Times3, Apr. 4, 1974, B6 to B7, for a history of the tribal takeover which analogized to an
American colony broken from British authority with a resolution.
37. In the 1950's, "termination" was manifested in the removal of protective trust status
from Indian land in the cases of the Ute, Western Oregon, and Menominee tribes. Public
Law 280 placed all Indian country under state criminal and civil jurisdiction in Alaska,
California, Wisconsin, Nebraska, and (with exceptions) Oregon and Minnesota. These lat-
ter states were mandatorily directed to take jurisdiction. Other states were given the option
to do the same thing. See Goldberg, Public Law280, supra note 33, at 563, 567.
38. See note 24 supra.
39. This began wich resolutions passed on July 24, 1946 and Feb. 21, 1947, to supplement
salaries of Navajo law and order personnel. Navajo Tribal Council Resolutions 1922 -55,
Window Rock, Ariz., 211-12 (1952).
40. SeeNTC Minutes, Aug. 10, 1949, at 40.
41. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-708 (1970).
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system. The tribe received favorable appraisals of its sovereignty
as measured by the working law and order system which it grafted
onto a Court of Indian Offenses.' Tribal attorneys gained the at-
tention of the courts and state officialdom.43
While creating an Anglo legal system, the tribe emphasized the
cultural distance separating Anglo law from the Navajo people.
The Navajo Yearbook set forth the tribe's official position to
Public Law 280 and captured the two elements of its position:
It is the general belief of the Navajo Tribal Council and a ma-
jority of the Navajo people that the extension of State Law
and State Court systems to the Reservation would be
premature at the present time because of the cultural
peculiarities that distinguish the Navajo from the non-
Navajo population. In order to meet the special requirements
of the Reservation area, the tribe is willing to support the law
enforcement and the judiciary systems despite the high an-
nual cost involved."
The record does not suggest that the tribe placed its money and
personnel into a federal-then-tribal legal system in order to ad-
dress the "cultural peculiarity" of Navajo society. ' While "cultural
42. The Courts of Indian Offenses, established at 25 C.F.R. § 1.2 (1976) have a strange
history. They were developed in 1890 to institutionalize judicial hearings not within the
state or federal court system but within the Office of Indian Affairs and the Department of
Interior. Congress never sanctioned them except indirectly through appropriations. W.
WASHBURN, THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 470-
75 (1973); Rules issued by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the In-
terior 1892 (Washington) at 25-31. First, agents were to employ the courts to abolish scalp-
dances, war dances, plural marriages, practices of medicine men, burial customs involving
destruction of property, and other "barbarous rites." Id. at 29. Second, they were to be
employed to bar use, sale, or transfer of intoxicants among Indians. Id. at 30.
The purpose of the courts was viewed by leading commentators and the courts as mere
educational and disciplinary instrumentalities of the federal government. United States v.
Clapox, 35 Fed. 575 (D. Ore. 1888). See also F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 148-49 (1942).
Although Cohen and others attempted to embellish the courts with a better set of regula-
tions, criticisms of the gap between how regulations define the court and the criminal and
civil needs of the Indians have been regular themes of students of Indian law. See, for exam-
ple, MERIAM, supra note 25, at 46, 766, 769; Barsh & Henderson, Tribal Courts, The Model
Code, and the Police Idea in American Indian Policy, 40 LAW & CoNTEMP.PROB. 25, 55
(1976).
43. Norman Littell was retained in 1947 and hired additional attorneys as assistants
throughout the era.
44.1958 YEARBOOK, supra note 19, at 143.
45. There is a continuing assumption that independent Native American law systems,
built on Anglo models by American law school and police academy-trained Native
Americans, will manifest cultural diversity if allowed to do so by the federal government.
See Barsh & Henderson, Tribal Courts, The Model Code and the Police Idea in American
Indian Policy, 11 LAw & CONTsEiP. PROB. 25, 56-60 (1976). The Navajo experience suggests
that matters of a purely cultural nature (e.g., witchcraft cases) will find a forum in a tribal
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peculiarity" probably did underlie disputes concerning who
should police or judge and the ties that Navajo police and judges
should have to local communities, those who suggested overtly
that non-Anglo approaches to conflict should be incorporated into
this legal system were in an insignificant minority."6
.In their debates, the Tribal Council did not consider institutions
or roles distinct from those proffered by the state legal systems
and by its guides, professional attorneys. The Council recognized
that the principal purpose of an active legal system in Navajo
communities was to avoid the systems of others. Navajos and
non-Navajos recognized that although the traditional community-
based system of law was often at variance with the norms and pro-
cess of state law, traditional law continued to serve as a guide
where Navajos were tied to kin and clan groups." The Council and
its attorney-advisers concluded that only a legal system which
resembled the state legal system, replete with legal specialists and
institutional arrangements, could block implantation of a system
in state hands."
1Knowledgeable observers expressed concern about the conflicts
inherent in forcing Anglo-American law upon non-Anglos. Their
protests were helpful in fending off state takeovers." However, the
Council and its attorneys appear to have been convinced that the
only legal system which would be recognized as valid was a
system modeled after state and federal design. Justice was unob-
tainable, at least in the Anglo sense under Navajo custom, despite
the fact that disputes had been effectively resolved up to this time.
The Navajos were concerned with the establishment of a legal
court only when well disguised as torts or criminal complaints. Yellowhair Interview, supra
note 12. This does not mean, however, that real complaints were always so redefined that
no desired relief was obtained by Navajos in court or by police.
Family complaints were resolved by Navajo police and Navajo judges under each do-
main. Whether relief was granted depended primarily on the policeman or judge's propensi-
ty to deal with the problem, however cast, in a traditional Navajo way.
It remains to be seen whether adoption of improved American institutional models and
role'; in the 1950's and decades thereafter within the context of an independent Navajo legal
system broadened or narrowed the diversity of the legal process. For a pessimistic appraisal
of American law and cultural diversity, see L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 15
(1973).
46. See text accompanying note 158 infra.
47. See SHEPARDSON & HAMMOND, supra note 11, at 55-56, 135-36.
48. See text accompanying notes 144 and 153 infra.
49. E.g., the resolution by anthropologists Clyde Kluchhohn and Dorothea Leighton
states that the mechanism of Navajo social control was too fluid to be readily understood
by white people who think of authority in terms of courts, police, and legislative
assemblies. C. KLUCKHOHN & D. LEIGHTON, THE NAVAJO (1946).
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forum which would be accepted by those who would challenge the
tribe's ability to govern.'
Tribal councilmen recognized that social change created prob-
lems outside the continuing realm of social control based on kin,
outfits, and clan relationships within a localized sheep and
livestock economy. The system of restitution and individualized
justice was insufficient to deal with the dangers of drinking,
especially during social occasions related to the new economy of
income-by-check. Young men returned from the war with ex-
posure to ways that traditional ceremonies could not reconcile
with the old life; stock reduction and the land base would not
allow an incorporation."1 Violence associated with drinking
emerged as an endemic problem, especially when tied to large
gatherings such as squaw dances or when railroad or relief checks
were distributed." Police were needed to protect people, and com-
munities requested that local men be deputized in order to control
and focus the work of the police upon Navajo problems and
Navajo remedies. Because the federal government would not pro-
vide funds for these requests, the tribe supplied the funds with the
concurrence of the Secretary of the Interior.'
The Council was concerned about the foreign nature of the legal
system and its laws; however, this peculiarity was taken for
granted in most internal discussions.' Of greater importance to
the Council was the issue of control of the system. While there
was an early consensus that the system would not be a state
system, there was vigorous debate on the issue of control within
the federal-tribe-community system which comprised the Navajo
political environment. For example, the Navajos could not enforce
their antipeyote ordinance when the federal police had been
ordered by their commissioner not to enforce the ordinance.' The
Navajos funded police for the Indian Service who could enforce
50. Only political and legal anthropologists, among non -Navajos, have been consistent-
ly cognizant of dispute processing by clans, chapter officers, and in informal meetings. See
SHEPARDSON & HAMMOND, supra note 11, at 55 -56, 129-33.
51. J. DOWNS, THE NAVAJO 132 (1972). Downs's view is confirmed by Navajo advocate
Zunie Yellowhair, who cites this group as the source of continuing problems which find the
way to legal services offices. Yellowhair Interview, supra note 12.
52. SeeNTC Minutes, Jan. 11, 1955, at 59, id., Jan. 12,1955, at 68, 72, 96.
53. Id. at 66.
54. Regarding the Law and Order Code, Chairman Paul Jones said (in support of a
resolution to appoint a law and order committee to make administrative suggestions);
"None of us here, as far as I know, are capable of making any changes in this Code because
it is legal and technical ......
55. See NTC Minutes, July 25, 1946, at 37 and D. ABERLE, PEYOTE RELIGION AMONG THE
NAVAJO 110 -21 (1966).
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the ordinance.' Should judges be non-English speaking and
elected and thereby tied more closely to their home communities,
or should they be educated, appointed, and professionalized so as
to reflect control by the Council and the image of modernization
that the tribe sought to offer to the states?" Should police be local-
ly elected and traditional, or young and less traditional? 3 Debates
in these terms were the real conflicts over the direction and con-
tent of the system.5
Although the pace and formality of the legal system were deter-
mined in part by the presence or absence of young or older person-
nel and their ties to local communities, there was a recognition
that other norms and fixtures of state legal systems were being ap-
propriated. Navajos were already confronting these same
elements of foreign law as they entered the markets and labor
pools off the reservation.'
I:n sum, the system constructed was more than an expensive
front to conceal and protect a society, its customs and resources
from outsiders. Navajo investment of scarce resources in the
sysf:em was expected to provide needed services and allow Nava-
jos to educate other Navajos to newly relevant laws. While
manifesting sovereignty to outsiders by encouraging and then
assuming a neglected federal responsibility, the legal system was
also designed to prove to people who were in fact only loosely
organized as a tribe that a centralized tribal government could be
trusted to govern.61
56. NTC Minutes, supra note 55, at 40.
57. See text accompanying note 107 infra.
58. See text accompanying notes 122-123 infra.
59. This is not to say that there was a sharp division between a traditional and modem
viewpoint among Navajos in this epoch. Older Navajos joined with veterans in encourag-
ing younger members of the tribe to contribute to the police system experience gleaned off
the reservation to the police system. Younger Navajos joined with older Navajos to seek
older judges. SeeVICENTI, supra note 2, at 185.
60. See Graves, The Personal Adjustment of Navajo Indian Migrants to Denver, Col-
ora do, 440-66, in H. BAHR, et al., NATIVE AMERICANS TODAY: SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
(1972).
61. Arbury Williams suggests that accommodation by both Navajos and the federal
government led to a decrease in radical opposition to the cultural content of leadership by a
central tribal council. "Accommodation among Navajos has come, in part, from a greater
awareness of the function of American Government via education in Anglo-American
schools, exposure to American ways during military service for the Government, and as a
result of contact with Americans in wage paying jobs away from the Navajo reservation. In
like manner, Americans working with Navajos .... have learned something of how Nava-
jos maintain social control, the importance Navajos attach to consensus, and how leaders
gain and maintain their positions. The Government reduced the intensity of opposition in
allowing the Navajo Tribal Council to select its own legal advisor as general counsel in
1947. The objections to a central, tribal-wide political structure with the authority to act on
behalf of all Navajos has decreased in recent years as revenue from mineral resources on
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Impact of the Fernandez Amendment
Any Navajo or Anglo who viewed the state of affairs which
confronted the tribe in June 1949, during its discussion of the Fer-
nandez amendment, would have believed that no opportunity ex-
isted for Navajos to construct their own legal system, either on
Anglo or non-Anglo models. Every agent of power was closed to
the idea."
During this time Congress attempted to impose state civil and
criminal laws on the Navajos as a condition for the passage of the
Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act. This Act provided for a decade-
long economic development plan leading to assimilation of Nava-
jos into the larger society. The Interior Department yielded to
Congressman Fernandez's threat to block authorizing legislation
for the Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act if his amendment was not
attached to the bill, then pending in his Indian Subcommittee of
the House Public Lands Committee." The amendment to the aid
package provided that states would be granted concurrent
jurisdiction over cases then heard in tribal courts on the Navajo
and Hopi reservations. In this fashion, the amendment pro-
claimed, Indians "shall have access to courts of such states for the
enforcement of their rights and the redress of wrongs to the same
extent and in the same manner as any other citizen thereof."'
The amendment specified that tax exemptions would continue
"until otherwise provided by Congress."' The responsibility for
public education would also be left to the federal government.
Norman Littell, tribal attorney since 1947, presented the amend-
ment for discussion, along with the substance of several telephone
conversations with Congressman Fernandez. Littell addressed the
situation in terms of its several realities, the amendment's near cer-
tainty of passage, the current state of native rights as established
by the courts and, finally, the current state of the Navajo legal
system in federal hands.67
Littell reminded the Council that complaints about Indian
courts were constant and described complaints which had come to
his attention:
tribal land ... has been continually considered as an economic asset which belongs to all
Navajos." A. WILLIAMS, THE NAVAJO POLITICAL PROCESS 61 (1970).
62. See text accompanying notes 63-78.
63. 25 U.S.C. § 636 (1954).
64. COLLIER, supra note 21, at 370.
65. NTC Minutes, June 9, 1949, at 38.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 39-40.
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The defendants don't have a jury or the right to a jury or a
lawyer. [The defendant] stands up before an Indian judge,
who to my knowledge, does not know English and so the
representative of the Bureau reads him the regulations and in-
terprets and tells the judge what the penalty is and the judge
tells the defendant what the penalty is. The situation has
haunted me but the problem is just too staggering for me to
do anything about it. It is all over the reservation and there
isn't money to reform the thing."
In 1948 the Navajo military veterans had criticized the system
on several grounds: lack of access to the rules or codes, lack of
educated judges, and the lack of sympathy on the part of judges
with "more modern thinking of the more educated members of the
Navajo tribe."'
The police and court system subsisted on tribal authorizations
in 1946 and 1947. Complaints about salaries taken to Congress by
Chairman Chee Dodge had been greeted with laughter in the com-
mittee room." The Council records were replete with criticisms of
police for their lack of education, personal conduct, and illegal ar-
rests.' The consistent response of the area superintendent was that
one could expect little more in the way of organization when such
low wages were paid."
Councilman Howard Gorman reported that his attempt in the
1930's to assist in modifying the Federal Code, along with the ef-
forts of Tom Dodge and Felix Cohen, had resulted in few
noticeable adoptions of tribal recommendations." Little substan-
tive improvement in the structure of justice or the quality of per-
sonnel appeared despite the contribution of Navajo money to dou-
ble the salaries in 19467' and to increase them again in 1947. The
6. Id. at 49.
69. NTC Minutes, Mar. 18, 1948, at 94-95. Older Council members supported their plea
for reform of federal Indian courts but were met by a response from the court's head, the
area superintendent, who said bluntly that, as with horses, you get what you pay for. Id. at
100.
70. NTC Minutes, Feb. 18, 1947, at 87. Complaints to Washington over inadequate
wages to police and judges did not begin with the Tribal Council. A disgruntled Indian
agent in 1883 said: "I have had no police. Navajos cannot be had for such a sum as $5 a
month. The right to fix the pay of police should be vested in the Secretary of Interior and
not be arbitrarily named by men who have no conception of the duties required." ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 121 (1883).
71. NTC Minutes, Mar. 18, 1948, at 97, 98.
72. Id. at 98.
73. See alsoFelix Cohen comment, NTC Minutes, July 13,1945, at 102.
74. NTC Minutes, July 23-26, 1946.
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tribal money had purchased more Navajo employees for what
many people viewed as an inadequate system.'
Access to the state court system was in essence access to
something not merely concurrent but entirely superior to the pres-
ent court system in terms of Anglo-American content. Navajos
were persuaded that they would be able to litigate against whites
as well as Navajos in state courts. 6 Congressman Fernandez
argued that what the Navajos had was no legal system at all, only
the shabby institutions placed there by non-Navajos. Further, he
saw individual Navajos persecuted by custom with no opportuni-
ty to defend themselves." When confronted with descriptions of
discrimination against Navajos by the state courts and police
departments which served border towns where Navajos worked
or shopped, Fernandez suggested that armed with the right to
vote, young Navajos could be placed in positions of responsibili-
ty. 7
Opposition to the amendment was from the start led by
Howard Gorman of Ganado. He focused not on the comparative
quality of justice as measured by either Anglo or Navajo stan-
dards but rather on the reality of state control of the legal system .
Gorman criticized the BIA for failing to provide education and
refusing to take advice offered by Navajos, and weighed the
amendment offered by Fernandez:
The amendment he has offered is going to open up the
doors for the Outside, maybe those people that vote for him
will come out here. The Spanish-Americans will police the
reservation. We don't stand in too good for these people. We
have been told from time to time that 85 % of the people are
illiterate, primitive, if you please and when you consider that
this thing is going to throw the Navajo tribe in the worst
chaos in the history of the Navajo tribe, I think none of these
councilmen will see the day when the state courts will take
over. We are going to endeavor to travel that direction
whether the amendment becomes an amendment or whether
it doesn't[;] we are going to reach that some day whether
75. See text accompanying notes 70-74 supra.
76. NTC Minutes, July 10,1949, at 60-61 (Dewey Etsitty).
77. WASHBURN, supra note 42, at 2028, 2033.
78. NTC Minutes, June 9, 1949, at 37-38. Littell endorsed this view. Id. at 39. Finally, at-
torney Littell suggested that the amendment would be offset in part by another which pro-
vided for a tribal constitution allowing the tribe greater management of its own affairs. Id.
at 41.
79. See text accompanying note 80 infra.
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Representative Fernandez has anything to say about that or
not. That is the reason we are advocating education among
the people. Education will solve the whole thing and even
though they build a wall around this reservation, our
children are going to climb over and accept the outside. We
will finally be assimilated to it. Right now I think it would be
a catastrophe to accept anything to go under the state law
and order. They will ask for tax money to pay. Navajos will
be asked to pay for their services. Also our tribal funds. They
are after that money .... w
Gorman suggested that the chasm between Anglo and Navajo
society was a fact of life with debilitating results. Where govern-
ment policy in the name of separatism, denied Navajos the tools
necessary to carry on a process of internal change and adjustment
to new demands, it also denied Navajos the capacity to pick the
moments, pace, and kind of changes which would allow their
society to survive. Thus, friends of the Navajo could damage the
society with a smothering kind of paternalism as readily as
enemies could damage the society with frontal assaults on its
capacity to seek its own way. This special appreciation of change
as a reality of life and preparation for change as a necessity for
preservation of core values was a formula utilized by Navajos.8'
Gorman did not reject out of hand the norms, roles, or institu-
tions of state law. Navajos were not prepared for application of
state law by outside legal specialists. Without a further opportuni-
ty to develop their own legal specialists, Navajos would not par-
ticipate in the application of law to Navajo life.'
The role of education as a "magic key" to political power was
reiterated time and again in Tribal Council deliberations. The
value of education was perceived as even greater than the poten-
tial wealth of natural resources in Navajo hands. Once obtained,
education could not be plucked away by a new interpretation of
law. Developed expertise within the Navajo community had
lasting value.'
By a vote of 37 to 20 the Council supported the Fernandez
80. NTC Minutes, June 9, 1949, at 46-47.
82. See KLUCKHOHN & LEIGHTON, supra note 18, at 66-67 (rev. ed. 1962), and DOWNS,
supra note 18, at 129-34.
82. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
83. For example, the Council decided to trade unlimited water rights to the Colorado
River for a federal endowment of its first community college. See Price & Weatherford,
Indian Water Rights in Theory and Practical Navajo Experience in the Colorado River
Basin, LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. (1976).
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amendment. ' After a congressional voice vote in favor of the
amendment, the advisory council of the tribe reversed its decision,
citing widespread grassroots opposition. Ultimately, the Council
reversed itself and approached President Truman to request that
the entire aid package be vetoed rather than allow the passage of
the Fernandez amendment.'
Truman vetoed the bill with a message that set forth themes
significantly different from those which drew the attention of
Council members. Truman responded to the argument raised by
ex-Indian Commissioner John Collier that the bill would supersede
a distinctive body of tribal customary law.' The Fernandez
amendment, said Truman, "might be construed as abrogating
these [customary] practices in one fell swoop and imposing upon
these Indians a system governing descent and distribution of per-
sonal property which they neither want nor understand."' 7
Truman emphasized that he viewed ultimate Navajo acceptance of
state jurisdication as a logical consequence of their social and
economic integration with Anglo society. For the present,
however, with four-fifths of the tribe non-English-speaking and a
majority unschooled, Truman concluded that it was "unjust and
unwise to compel them to abide by state laws written to fill other
needs than theirs."'
The Truman veto addressed indirectly the expressed Navajo
concerns with control of the Anglo legal system which they ex-
perienced and the quality of their system. Truman created a pro-
longed opportunity for them to proceed with independent expan-
sion of a legal structure, even though the expansion had little or
nothing to do with redefining law in order to treat the disparity
between law and custom that so concerned Truman."
The President reiterated what he termed was a long-standing
policy of respect for tribal self-government: "The Congress and
the Executive Branch have repeatedly recognized that so long as
Indian communities wished to maintain and were prepared to
maintain their own political and social institutions, they should
not be forced to do otherwise. " '
The Truman veto served several purposes. First, it was accepted
by Congressman Fernandez who assisted in securing the bill's
84. NTC Minutes, June 9,1949, at 65.
85. 5 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 602-603 (1949).
86. COLLIER, supra note 21, at 370.
87. PUBLIC PAPERS OF HARRY S. TRUMAN 515 (1964).
88. Id. at 516.
89. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
90. PUBLIC PAPERS OF HARRY S TRUMAN 515 (1964).
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passage without his amendment in the next congressional session."
Second, the veto gave new life to opportunities for Navajo tribal
self-government, to the extent that they were prepared to pay their
own way, and gave new life to their argument for a separate legal
system based on their present cultural difference. Finally, the veto
bought time for the tribe to muster its own resources in order to
develop a system of law which would meet tests of similarity and
not diversity.
Navajo Response
Navajos attempted to graft changes onto the federal system
which reflected their own ideas regarding the need for further
education, participation by Navajos, and control shared indirectly
by communities and the tribe.' On several occasions, councilmen
had decried the system of appointment of Indian judges by the
agency superintendent. State judges were elected, it was argued,
and so Navajo judges should be.93 The first substantive reform
passed by the Council in a 1950 election reform resolution was to
have judges elected from local districts," ignoring arguments that
justice would be biased by clan relationships.' Deputy police, paid
with tribal funds, were elected informally by local communities in
chapter house meetings."
The Secretary of Interior approved this resolution and in-
advertently enhanced its localizing effect by diminishing funding
for circuit riding. ' Circuit riding had been employed not only to
circulate judges through outlying communities but as an attempt
by the Indian Service to rotate judges when they might be in-
fluenced by familial relationships."
Arguing that there was a need for centralization, for ad-
ministrative and for educational purposes, attorney Littell drafted
a resolution in 1953, which provided for two major reforms of the
Court of Indian Offenses. A Navajo chief judge would be ap-
pointed to administer the court but not to hear appeals. The tribal
attorney, the area superintendent of the Indian Service, and the
91. 6 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 387 (1950).
92. See text accompanying notes 93-96 and 122-124 infra.
93. See comment by Deshne Clah Chischillige, NTC Minutes, July 17,1977, at 64.
94. Tribal Council Resolution 1922-51, passed Aug. 21, 1951, at 220.
95. KLUCKHOHN & LEIGHTON, supra note 18, at 65.
96. NTC Minutes, Jan. 7,1953, at 89.
97. Id. at 91.
98. See L. Mueller, Chief Special Officer, "The Navajo Law and Order Problem" (Aug.
10, 1936), Hearings, Senate Subcomm. on Indian Affairs, Survey of Conditions of Indians
in 'he United States, app. 10, 17996, 17998, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
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federal government's local attorney would act as an appellate
court until such time as Navajos schooled in law could take their
placesY The purpose of the proposed reforms would be twofold.
First, the chief judge would give some structure to the existing
court system. Littell argued that at present, "Each judge is a kind
of law unto himself, unlike the outside world where, in every
court there is more than one judge. Every such court would have a
presiding judge, or Chief Judge, who would assign work in an
equitable fashion."'" Littell's argument for a case docket and a line
of authority running from elected judges to a chief judge was
strengthened by complaints from police that cases were left pend-
ing or were dismissed through judicial inactivity. '
John Collier had criticized the control of Indian judges by In-
dian Service personnel when he attempted to reform the systems
by statute and then by regulation." The plan represented a critical
philosophical difference between the tribal attorney and the earlier
Indian Commissioner."
The Navajos were building a legal service within an Indian Ser-
vice mantle which was expected to be an eventual fixture within
their tribal government along with the adoption of a tribal con-
stitution. The legal system outlined in the constitutional proposal
which Congress had mandated in the Navajo-Hopi act would be
99. NTC Minutes, Jan. 7,1953.
100. Id. at 93.
101. Id. at 88. Yet, Littell's "law unto himself" argument may have been a misinterpreta-
tion of this apparent disorder. From his perspective, a court system required an ad-
ministrative structure as well as a hierarchy of checks and balances. The fact that the Nava-
jo judges were tied as never before to local constituencies was irrelevant. He never con-
sidered that cases might have been dismissed or left pending because communities wanted
this result. Consumers of the system may have wanted police intervention without judicial
review and punishment.
102. J. Freeman, Jr., "The New Deal for Indians: A Study in Bureau-Committee Rela-
tions in American Government" (unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, 1954), at 123; COLLIER, supra
note 21, at 229.
103. Ivenson reports that Littell "sharply disagreed with Collier's notion of traditional
Native American life teaching other Americans, saying what Collier wanted was not for
450,000 Indians to 'join the 160,000,000 citizens in the American way of life but the
160,000,000 Americans are to join the Indian in his ancient rites and beliefs'!" P. Ivenson,
159 (unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, 1975).
Collier advocated indirect rule as a way to achieve "mutuality between the races, peace
to the Indian's heart, and the conservation of ancient Indian values through planting within
them new hopes and new practical goals." COLLIER, supra note 21, at 345.
Littell saw legal reforms as a means to "throw a bridge across from an isolated society
heretofore maintained deliberately as a matter of erroneous policy, as a museum piece, to
the broader life of American citizens in the world beyond their reservation." Ivenson,
supra, at 158.
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ani Anglo legal system with appellate and trial judges."' The Nava-
jos had only one available law graduate"° and no trained police.
Littell concluded that to protect the system, untrained Navajo
judges and police would have to be supervised by attorneys and
professional police who were not Navajos."' Once again, the ap-
pearance of the system to outsiders was as critical as the im-
mediate impact of the system on the daily lives of Navajos. The in-
clusion of a federal attorney and the federal superintendent
reflected the uncertain base of authority upon which the tribal
system would eventually rest.
Councilwoman Annie Waneuka advocated a reorganization ef-
fort similar to the one proposed by Littell. However, she recog-
nized that the 1950 resolution to elect judges reflected a continuing
desire on the part of many Navajos to be policed and judged by
those who were uninfluenced by Anglo law ways. These people
maintained in a somewhat contradictory fashion that "there is no
penetration in our heads of foreign language and, nevertheless, we
should be allowed on the staff of the Law and Order set up.""°
To place educated non-Navajos at the top of a reconstituted
police and court system necessarily reflected a second compromise
between elements of the tribe. The Navajo constituency which
viewed educated professionals as an ipso facto replacement of
Navajo law with white man's law were left with judges and police
at the local level who were selected by their constituents. Only the
higher positions within the system would be modified by the 1953
resolution in a way which would strengthen tribal control, bind
tribal and federal authority, and thus meet the challenge of ter-
mination."~
104. NTC Minutes, June 9, 1949, at 40-41. Littell offered his proposed appellate court
and tribal court reform as a separate resolution since, in his view, that reform could not
await passage of the constitution allowed by the Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act. 25
U.S.C. § 636 (1954). SeeNTC Minutes, Jan. 9, 1953, at 158-60, for the constitutional pro-
posal.
105. Tom Dodge, son of Chee Dodge, was an Indian Service employee. See also NTC
Minutes, Jan. 8, 1953, at 110.
'106. Littell was no romantic about perpetuating custom in a modern world; neither was
he unaware that the basis of tribal authority which would stem from that constitution
would be subject to judicial and legislative interpretation by foes of tribal governments.
Both his professional grounding and his political sensitivity must have told him that if this
element of the tribal government was to survive scrutiny by the states, the courts, and Con-
gress, it would have to have more than the shape of an Anglo court and police system. To
ground this or any other branch of tribal government upon inherent powers only, ignoring
the veto power implicit in congressional legislation, would have been folly. Thus, a trium-
virate was created which attempted to bind the two sources of governmental power, federal
and tribal, upon which tribal authority could be explained. See note 103 supra.
1.07. NTC Minutes, Jan. 7, 1953, at 96.
1.08. "Tribal Appellate Court," unnumbered Navajo tribal resolution, NTC Minutes,
Jan. 8, 1953, at 106-107.
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Acting on a request from the off-reservation community of
Crownpoint and a 1945 resolution which had approved tribal
legal activity on off-reservation Indian country, the Council paid
to have six policemen and a tribal judge serve in the eastern Nava-
jo "checkerboard" region.1" This was to be no more than one of a
series of tribal appropriations accepted by the federal government
which allowed Navajos increased leverage on selection of person-
nel and determination of their location. By 1953, about half of the
30-man force as well as the judges of the Court of Indian Offenses
were paid from tribal funds.1" Tribally paid police and judges,
supervised by the Federal Indian Service, established law and
order in off-reservation communities where state law and not
federal law was inactive or discriminatory."
The Indian Commissioner rejected the resolution calling for the
establishment of an appellate court of Anglo professionals, the on-
ly law and order resolution ever rejected by the Department of In-
terior in Navajo history.11" Commissioner Dillon Myer stated that
these were, after all, not Navajo tribal judges but judges of the
Court of Indian Offenses with authority derived from the
Secretary of Interior. He would offer no objection if the tribe
wished to establish a tribal court and undertake complete revision
of law enforcement activities on the reservation."
Commissioner Myer, by his rejection, withdrew federal
authority for the first court reform, which implied professionaliza-
tion of the Indian justice system on a par with the states. The tribal
attorney had attempted to build a legal system upon federal power
as well as inherent tribal authority. The Court of Indian Offenses
could be funded by Navajos, but as courts of the Department of
the Interior, improvements which would have discouraged states'
aspirations to take over criminal and civil jurisdiction could not be
made.
Commissioner Myer could not overtly remove the option pro-
109. 1953 YEARBOOK, supra note 19, at 280-81.
110. NTC Minutes, Jan. 8,1953, at 103-104.
111. E.g., on failure of the city of Gallup to live up to promises to clean up the city's jail
conditions or control liquor sales, see comments of Hoskie Crane Meyer, NTC Minutes,
June 22, 1955, at 269-70. See also comments of Billy Becenti (Crownpoint) NTC Minutes,
Jan. 13, 1955, at 130; Interview with Jeanette Saunders (Mariano Lake, N.M.), in ViCENTI,
supra note 2, at 350, 358; L. KELLY, THE NAVAJOS AND FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY 189 (1968).
See earlier comments on the situation in MERIAM, supra note 25, at 764. The chairman
assessed the situation as a law and order setup "previously run by the government" and
"done away with and thrown in our laps." Supra note 110, at 95.
112. Navajo Tribal Code tit. 7, § 31 (1962), at 358; Letter of Mar. 3, 1953 (Law and
Order 879-53, 880-53) quoted in Resolution Co-69-58.
113. Id.
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vided by the Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act to establish a court
and police system under the constitution promulgated pursuant to
the Act. But by vetoing the resolution, he could remove all federal
resources and the impression of federal cooperation with the
reform. If the court was to be reformed, it would require an ex-
clusive tribal undertaking, accomplished by Navajos who were
not trained.
In the end, further consideration of court reform under a tribal
constitution was mooted by tribal rejection of the entire constitu-
tional mode of organization including its appellate court pro-
vision."' Tribal court records show no further attempts by the
tribal attorney to reform the court structure for five years." '
In anticipation and in response to state court and agency
scrutiny, the Council adopted state traffic laws, state adoption
procedures, and other elements of the state's criminal and civil
codes."6 The Council continued to appropriate money for police,
but now urged that younger men be hired."7 This attempt to place
power into the hands of those who had experienced law off the
reservation resulted in increased arrests. However, complaints
directed at the police also mounted. Jewelry was pawned for bail
and fines when relatives came to retrieve the arrested individuals.
Arrested persons were taken to distant jails and released far from
their home communities. By 1954, the courts showed a backlog of
1,700 cases."8
A resolution to extend police and court services to Ramah, a sec-
ond off-reservation community, and the appearance of an Anglo
114. Littell wrote Mary Shepardson in 1960: "No constitution has been adopted and it is
not anticipated that one will be for sound practical and legal reasons which have developed
since the Navajo-Hopi Limitation [ sic] Act containing a compromise provision on a con-
stitution which would increase rather than decrease the powers of the Secretary [of the In-
terior]." Citedin M. SHEPARDSON, NAVAJO WAYS IN GOVERNMENT (1963). Shepardson com-
ments that another view is that some decisions which the Council can make without referral
to the electorate would have to be so referred under a "limiting" constitution Id.
The better view is that events and especially more expansive interpretations of sovereign-
ty in the latter part of the decade made further attempts to pass a constitution counter-
productive. Littell had, after all, continued to urge a constitution on the Council after the
Navajo-Hopi act was passed. The rejection was its rejection, not his.
[15. See text accompanying note 166 infra.
116. For example, Tribal Resolution 7-55-53 imposed traffic laws and regulations,
modeled after New Mexico's and Arizona's, in order to accomplish competent coordination
of Navajo traffic law and state traffic law. 14 Navajo Tribal Council Resolutions 68, 74
(1958). Resolutions had been previously passed to incorporate state law in order to per-
suade Navajos to stay out of state court, e.g., concerning divorce. NTC Minutes, July 17,
19,14, at 17-18, 21.
117. NTC Minutes, Jan. 12, 1955, at 93 (retrospective account). This zeal was tempered
by a second decision that Navajo deputized police ride horseback as had their predecessors
in the 1930's and, even earlier, in the days of Manuelito. Id.
:118. NTC Minutes, Jan. 13, 1955, at 113.
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head of police sparked a renewed inquiry into the business of law
and order. The investigation which followed was to become the
longest sustained discussion to date of the subject in Council
chambers."9
Patrick Nelson, head of the federal branch of law and order,
met a barrage of questions and complaints. Two councilmen told
of unlawful arrests at the hands of police. One had been picked up
in a case of mistaken identity and transported across the reserva-
tion to Tuba City, where he was held overnight in jail until re-
leased by the court. The other had been beaten.'0
Many communities petitioned for part-time police to handle
their liquor problems. Few of these requests could be honored.
Transfers of men by the new chief and the problems experienced
by the councilmen seemed to some to contradict a tacit agreement
that the Council had made with the local law and order personnel
and with the area superintendent that "the community would
choose and recommend their own police and then they would
know who they had for police and what kind of man they would
have for police.''.
The Council learned that its desire to see younger men
employed had resulted in the purge of non-English speakers or
their transfer from fulltime to part-time positions as special
deputies on horseback. Younger men did not know the com-
munities nor were they well trained in the law. With neither com-
munity loyalty nor training to guide them, their actions were
viewed as excessive and arbitrary.' "
Inattention on the part of the federal law and order chief did not
create confusion in the direction of this coalition of 76 fulltime
police and special deputies. Instead, the chief's problem stemmed
from conflicting messages received from the Council and from the
communities as to what police should do and who they should
be." Nelson and the councilmen shared an appreciation of the li-
quor problem which plagued the reservation. Both Arizona and
New Mexico had by this time repealed state prohibitions against
sale of liquor to Indians. This facilitated the flow of liquor onto
the reservation where possession and use were still prohibited by
federal law. Bootlegging was facilitated not only by increased sup-
119. NTC Minutes, Jan. 11-13,1955.
120. Id. at 55,110.
121. Id. at 57.
122. Id. at 93,110.
123. Id. at 53. Forty-four policemen were federally paid. Thirty-two policemen were
tribally paid regular officers and deputies.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1978
ply but, ironically, by improvement of the road network into the
reservation as a result of the Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act.'24
Among consumers of liquor were young Navajo males,
unemployed or employed seasonally, and often detached from the
sheep-herding society and its social controls. Some young males
who had replaced older Navajos as fulltime police fell victim to
peer pressure and drank." They were terminated as police and
replaced by other young Navajo men. Young men who were
English-speaking were trainable, Nelson argued, as others would
argue on behalf of younger English-speaking judges and advocates
in the years that followed."
Hogan-level Navajos prized the experience which education
could bring to Navajo society through its younger people.
However, in matters of social control, they valued also the
wisdom of age and the influence of the family structure. '2
Dismissal of court cases for failure of the officer to appear or to
present an adequate case not subject to dismissal when he did ap-
pear was an Anglo law problem and not necessarily a problem
perceived by Navajo communities."
To Navajo communities, an absence of police at large public
gatherings meant that problems occurred. Prevention of trouble
by a figure attached to the community but now also tied to the
power of the federal and tribal governments was what many
Navajos believed they had been purchasing by underwriting law
enforcement in federal hands.2
124. Id. at 66, 68.
125. Id. at 54.
126. Id. at 61, 77.
127. Maturity meant several things. Older police, whether grounded in Anglo defini-
tions of police work or not, were prepared to do more than make arrests. They were
prepared to arbitrate complaints when they arose at squaw dances; they were prepared to
tall: to intoxicated persons and take steps to protect the individuals. Criminal law problems
were not necessarily criminal law problems at all in the Navajo community. Some Navajo
judges and police understood this situation. Yellowhair Interview, supra note 12; Interview
with Tribal Court Judge Tom Becenti, VICENn, et al., in 2 LAW OF THE PEOPLE 218 (1972).
128. SeeVIcEN I, supra note 2, at 162-63.
129. See, e.g., the statement of Councilman Chavez Coho on the interplay of custom
and law services funded by the tribe. "Sometimes we have some kind of an ailment where
we need some kind of medical assistance, like we may want to hire our own medicine man,
we still are in trouble in order to inform him of the condition we are in. The same is true of
a Doctor when we need assistance. We usually tell the Doctor what is ailing us. Sometimes
we do not bother about it. We hesitate about going and consulting them about it, thinking
by its own natural cures, we may overcome it and get well again and, consequently, it
begins to accumulate on us until it gets so big. Such is the situation regarding our Law and
Order in my area. Heretofore we have been isolated from our part of the Tribe. We have
been handicapped along that line and have tried to keep those things under control by
presenting them and talking to our people. Sometimes we get the Chapter Officers to take
care of these things and sometimes we appoint someone to attend to these cases, but it got
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Older Navajos, presumably untrainable, had been relegated to
the part-time positions.'" While communities could petition for
these positions, their candidates were scrutinized by Anglo stan-
dards for past law violations and for education. Fulltime police
were out of Navajo control. The small group of police and their
limited resources were utilized in a way appropriate to Anglo law
enforcement."'
The gap between Navajo intent and professional intent could
have been narrowed had the federal government provided funds
sufficient to add personnel, equipment, and facilities. The newly
formed law and order committee reported on the abysmal quality
of courts and jails. Suggestions were made to condition the further
funding of police in Ramah on matching federal contributions.2
In the end, a compromise was reached. The tribe's law and
order committee would recommend to the chief where police
would be stationed and what qualifications tribal persons should
meet within the law and order branch. From its inception, the
compromise was unsteady. Because English-speaking Navajos
were necessary in order to be trained by English-speaking instruc-
tors, it was still not likely that older police would be appointed as
fulltime officers." Tribally paid police filled the needs of off-
reservation communities. Deputies who were locally hired were
paid from tribal funds. 3'
Sam Gody pointed out that the tribe was left to enforce a code
to a point where we could not do anything with it and the reason for that was that people
were beginning to use outside legal help against our own way of trying to do these things so
that we have to go and call on you people for help along that line, and what we need there
most is a Judge located there with a police officer so that they can take care of this situation.
We, the people who are living out on the edges of the Navajo population, where we are
kind of out of reach from the interior, feel very much handicapped along this line in lots of
ways. Not only that, but in lots of ways we seem to have been forgotten on lots of things,
so far just wishing and hoping that some time you people will take notice of it and help us
out some way to remedy these things out there for us and start from the bottom and work
upward and try to straighten out a lot of these problems for us and that is our thought out
there. That is the thought of the Navajo people living out there on the edge of the Navajo
Reservation." NTC Minutes, Jan. 12., 1955, at 82 -83.
130. NTC Minutes, Jan. 11-13, 1955, at 111.
131. Testimony of Chief Patrick Nelson before the Tribal Council, NTC Minutes, Jan.
11, 1955, at 52-55.
132. Id. at 92. There was little or no likelihood that the Congress would provide funds
for these improvements. Attorney Littell and the area director discouraged the Council.
The Navajos were moving in a direction that other Indian tribes had not taken. The Depart-
ment of Interior had funded only one Zuni policeman and one Hopi. Id. at 123. C. Hodge
& W. King, "Indians and the Law," at 50 (unpub. dissertation on file at Bureau of Ethnic
Research, Univ. of Ariz. 1958).
133. See comments by Nelson, NTC Minutes, June 22,1955, at 266.
134. NTC Minutes, Jan. 11. 1955, at 55, 57.
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of laws which it had not passed as its own. "Until the law is changed
we are just being told 'you want to spend your money for
something over which you have no authority.""' Eugene Gordy
asked, "I wonder why they hesitate to do something for us,
because we are still wards of the Government and, as such, they
should be concerned about us, but they do hesitate to do
something for our Tribe. Is it because we have a [17 million dollar]
tribal fund or that they do not care so much what happens to our
people?"' 36
The answer to Gordy's question may have been that Congress
and the Interior Department were awaiting initiatives by the states
which would transfer the problem of law and order on the reserva-
tion to them. Several new developments seemed to support this
theory.
State Jurisdiction
Anticipating the burden of state and city responsibility for law
and order, the city of Gallup asked the tribe to provide funds to
handle Navajo offenders in its city.1 7 The Tribal Council rejected
the request and the tribal attorney began a pattern of litigation
which would result in new changes in the power of tribal courts.'
In Williams v. Lee,'9 a trader on the reservation sought to en-
force a debt against Paul Williams incurred on the reservation by
means of a state court order. If state courts had jurisdiction over
the civil claims against the Navajos, it was conceivable that a blow
would be struck to the tribal government of far greater sig-
nificance than any which had preceded it. State courts would be
able to seize Navajo personal property and sell it in order to col-
lect debts. Jurisdiction over civil matters would be obtained
regardless of whether the state assumed responsibility for all serv-
ices under Public Law 280."° Such selective incorporation was
favored by Arizona..' and other states who desired something
135. NTC Minutes, Jan. 11-13, 1955, at 91.
136. Id. at 96.
137. NTC Minutes, June 22, 1955, at 271.
138. See text accompanying notes 139-142 infra.
139. 83 Ariz. 241, 319 P.2d 998 (1958). The Arizona Supreme Court upheld the power
and authority of a county sheriff to serve process and the state court to hear the debt ac-
tion. Williams appealed the case to the United States Supreme Court with the help of the
tribal attorney.
140. Id.
141. Arizona apparently had to amend its constitution in order to take advantage of
Public Law 280. However, Arizona did later assume jurisdiction over air and water pollu-
tion matters in what may prove to be a questionable interpretation of its authority. See
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other than the all-or-nothing responsibilities of Public Law 280."2
It was the problem of judicial debt collection that returned the
question of law and order, including the role of courts and police,
to the Council floor on July 17, 1956. At issue was a Tribal Coun-
cil resolution to amend the powers of the court so that judgments
could be executed upon and tribal police could seize property to
satisfy judgments of the Indian courts." The resolution was long
and replete with legalese. The tribal chairman said, noting "the
long faces and shut eyes of his colleagues," that it was "one of the
most uninteresting subjects that this Council has at any time ever
discussed.'' However, boredom was not the reaction to the
resolution; instead, hostility to the implications of the resolution
was evident. Providing the court with police power to seize per-
sonal property of Navajos for tribal or for Anglo creditors raised
anew the specter of the 1930's stock reduction program."5
Goldberg, supra note 33, at 569.
142. During 1959 the Department of the Interior reacted to this point of view by sup-
porting piecemeal assumption of jurisdiction either geographically or in certain types of
cases. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 239-40 (1959).
143. "Providing for Execution of Judgments by Navajo Court of Indian Offenses in Civil
Cases" NTC Minutes, July 17,1956, at 38-43.
144. Id. at 52.
145. See comments of Councilwoman Annie Wanueka, NTC Minutes, July 17, 1956, at
57-58: "This material that has been presented here in this Reservation to authorize our
police force to go out and gather up property, sheep and other chattels of our Navajo
peoples and dispose of them by sale, I do not believe that is right. These police are not in-
volved in trying to control grazing on the Navajo Reservation, but they are criticized for
the way they are doing their own work they are already assigned to do. Those of us who
are on the Grazing Committee are faced with enough criticism by our people for trying to
tell them how they should graze their stock. To authorize policemen to go out and gather
up some poor woman's few head of sheep and dispose of it, I do not know of any good
reasoning behind it. We are in crying need for water. The present conditions do not allow
us to enjoy anything but the immediate needs from day to day because we have had no
rains. It is too dry. Our stock are suffering and we are thirsty so why impose a regulation
such as this on our poor people?"
Compare D. PARMAN, THE NAVAJOS AND THE NEw DEAL 65-67 (1976): "The massive an-
tagonism toward the second herd reduction was based on the complex and profound at-
tachment Navajos held for their sheep and goats. Glimmers of their thinking were apparent
from the older council members' repeated remarks equating their attachment for livestock
to whites' lust for money, but Collier, despite his sympathy for Navajo culture, did not ful-
ly comprehend how deeply the tribe felt about the subject. Equally remarkable, he never
commissioned a study on the subject, although he subsidized several investigations of other
cultural topics ....
"Despite their suspicion of persons who have acquired wealth too quickly, Navajos
largely determine social status by the amount of stock a family owns. Thus Chee Dodge
was venerated only in part because of his past experience and ability to deal with federal of-
ficials. He and other prominert leaders were additionally respected because they possessed
horses, sheep, jewelry, and blankets. In fact, the Navajos' economic concepts came amaz-
ingly close to approximating the puritan work ethic of whites. James F. Downs, an an-
thropologist, found in his interviews that 'single families will tell with pride how their im-
mediate ancestors began life with only a few sheep but increased the herd through
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Certainly no recorded encounter between an Anglo attorney
(here Laurence Davis, the assistant to Littell) and the Tribal Coun-
cil demonstrated more clearly how far apart their motivations for
reform of the legal process were. Davis argued that if the Court of
Indian Offenses was not empowered to act on civil judgments,
outside creditors who could not collect their debts would press the
state legislatures to intervene with their court systems."6 Not only
Anglo creditors but the tribe needed this power to collect money
from tribal members by seizing and selling their property, Davis
reasoned. With the increased royalties from oil and gas leases, the
tribe had established a revolving loan fund for Navajos. Surely,
the attorney argued, Council members would realize that all debts
incurred must be paid."'
To the Navajos, debt relationships were secured traditionally
by families as well as by individuals. They generally arose out of
ongoing relationships between creditor and debtor, be they Nava-
jo and white trader or Navajo and Navajo."' The installment
salesmen who were then only beginning to beseige the Navajo for
business were to be given less credence. Said Councilman Paul
Begay:
Where installment buying is encouraged by salesmen that is
not our fault. We do not want to flood our Courts with these
cases in the event the Navajos should not take care of their
payments. They go on the radio and advertise that "You can
take everything you want under our installment plan." So
why should we be concerned about making collections for
them? We do not need to flood our courts with their prob-
lems.
perseverance, the proper exercises of ritual power, and right living.'... Prior to New Deal
livestock regulations, Navajo parents customarily set aside part of the increase of their
herds for their children as patrimony when they married. With all members sharing owner-
ship, the herd became a focal point for the entire extended family. Each day the flock was
driven out of the pen near the hogan and herded by youngsters under the careful supervi-
sion of adults. Even the grand matron of the family might herd, either trudging behind the
sheep and goats with a staff and rattling a tin can filled with pebbles, or, in a more regal
manner, astride a horse. Lambing, shearing, castrating, and moving the herd to new
pastures united the family, and members normally absent because of outside work or mar-
riage appeared to help on such occasions .... Operating without individual ownership of
land and having no strong taboo against financial insolvency, the Navajos still sensed that
herd reduction would disrupt the very fabric of their existence, threaten some of their most
central social and religious values, and raise questions for the future that federal wages
could not answer (footnotes omitted)."
146. NTC Minutes, July 17, 1956, at 44.
147. Id. at 52.
148. See Conn & Reichbart, inVICENTi, supra note 2, at 64-76.
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In the case of one Navajo owing another Navajo, one in-
dividual to the other, the same thing will be true. We are go-
ing to have more indebtedness cases filling our Courts and do
we have enough Courts to take care of these matters? I
believe it is up to the Councilmen to encourage repayment of
any debts owed by their people. In my case I have to do that.
I feel that I am responsible in seeing that my people do not go
into debt beyond their ability to repay, thereby we keep out
of debt in my area.4 9
Where tied to the community or local economic cycles, debts
were repaid. In this realm, social control by the family or by
chapter officers was strong enough without law. The tribe's loan
program was built upon this local base. Loans were screened by
individuals in local communities. The tribe lost only seven-tenths
of 1 per cent of nearly $700,000 disbursed. ' - The scope of the
resolution was viewed as excessive. How could all property be
made subject to seizure by police?51
In response, the tribal chairman and Howard Gorman posed the
threat of Public Law 280. "Our two states," said Chairman Jones,
"are still likely to do anything on it and we do not want to give the
States any chance to use it for their own benefit.., if we do not go
anywhere near pleasing the State, they will do their way and we
cannot do anything about it.". Concluded Gorman,
Even though we do not like to hear it said here, Public Law
280 is staring us in the face. Yes, it is true that we have not
got money and it is pretty hard to get it but taking into con-
sideration what the authorities are planning to do, we have
to do something about it. You remember the Fernandez
Amendment .... If it had become law, we would have been
under the State now. We would not have any jurisdiction
over our police force."
The chairman agreed with other Council members that the
resolution should be tabled until it was reworded to narrow the
scope of property which could be seized and prohibit the police
from seizing on behalf of Anglo creditors. The attorneys returned
two days later with a resolution which deleted money, jewelry,
firearms, and ammunition from items to be taken. Seventy-five
149. NTC Minutes, July 17,1956, at 53-54.
150. COLLIER, supra note 2, at 254.
151. NTC Minutes, July 17,1956, at 56.
152. Id. at 55.
153. Id. at 67.
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sheep per person were also protected."3 The police were not men-
tioned in the amended resolution. The attorneys explained that
police, not loan committee members, had to take the property
because the police were deputized.
Some councilmen were not pleased with the compromise. Paul
Begay withdrew his motion and Annie Waneuka withdrew her sec-
ond. Begay promised that, "When it beomes law, you will hear all
kinds of complaints and criticism from our own people...56
The plight of the off-reservation areas, subject to state as well as
tribal law, was reiterated. It appears that the Council's concern
that police would be used as bill collectors did not stem from any
bias against police in their usual reservation role. In the same ses-
sion, the absence of police service in off-reservation Navajo com-
munities, subject to state as well as tribal law, was addressed and
remedied.'"' Even before the tribal treasury was filled by oil and
gas royalties," the Council had provided police for these areas
when the state provided no police protection.
'The tribal attorneys must have known that the critical issue of
state jurisdiction over Indians raised in Williams v. Lee had at its
factual core an obvious question sure to be raised in the Supreme
Court of Arizona and, later, in the United States Supreme Court.
Outside courts and outside creditors were mollified by the passage
of the resolution. In oral arguments of Williams v. Lee, the United
States Supreme Court asked the tribal attorney to provide an ac-
count of the number of civil actions for debts brought by non-
Navajos in' tribal court."' The attorneys provided statistics to
show that courts had become vehicles for these civil claims."w In
fact, few Navajos used the court for collection of their debts. Until
the emergence of lay advocates in the 1960's, civil cases were
largely those debt cases of non-Navajos and divorce or support
cases urged upon Navajos by welfare agencies."' Navajos could
still seek damages or claims by using chapter officers and other
figures in the home communities. 6
154. NTC Minutes, July 19, 1956, at 130.
155. Id. at 137.
156. Id. at 138. In the end, the Council approved the compromise by a vote of 50 to 16.
157. Id. at 139-40.
158. The tribe received 33 million dollars in oil and gas lease royalties in 1956. 1956
YEARBOOK, supra note 19, at 242.
159. Appeals record, Williams v. Lee, 385 U.S. 217 (1959).
160. Id.
161. In the last year of the Navajo Court of Indian Offenses, the court handled 9,555
criminal cases and 690 civil actions. Mary Shepardson reported that one judge in the 1960's
handled 2,216 criminal and only 275 civil cases, Shepardson, Problems of the Navajo
Tribal Courts in Transition, 24 HUMAN ORGANIZATION 250-53 (1960).
162. SHEPARDSON & HAMMOND, supra note 11, at 21, 133, 135.
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Court Reorganization
In that same 1956 session, the tribal attorneys had requested
and received authority to develop a plan of court reorganization.'"
The Council was prepared to spend ten times that of other
Arizona Indian tribes to mount a large law and order campaign
both on and off the reservation to avoid state intervention.'"
The Council was not prepared to consider resolutions in the
manner of lawyer-legislators. Members usually deferred to their
attorneys. They could pinpoint dominant Navajo values that the
lawyers overlooked. The lawyers were skilled at reading the
perceptions of non-Navajos who posed a threat to Navajo self-
government. They were not interested in traditional approaches to
conflict adjustment whether employed outside the court or inside
the courtroom. For them, only judges in the Anglo mold were to
be developed.'"
In 1958, the tribal attorneys were prepared to present to the
Council a plan of court reform which granted Navajo control of
the system. The plan was coupled with resolutions making the
federal code of Indian offenses the Navajo tribal code and
establishing a Navajo police force.'" Williams v. Lee was pending
in the United States Supreme Court.67 Interior Secretary Seaton
had "clarified" the Department's termination policy by deem-
phasizing it.'" However, the threat of Public Law 280 was still the
major persuasive device employed by assistant tribal attorney
Davis to sell the features of a plan that implied further change in
direction for the legal system.'" Judges would no longer be elected
and candidates for judgeships would be young men who could be
trained.
Davis argued that the age qualification could be lowered from
thirty-five to twenty-one in order to reach into a larger pool of
Navajos who had benefited from secondary education and even
163. NTC Minutes, July 18,1975, at 109.
164. HODGE & KING, INDIANS AND THE LAW 52 (1958).
165. See, e.g., comments by Davis, NTC Minutes, Oct. 15, 1958, at 253, 254, on
employment of seasoned Navajo attorneys. But see contrary position by Davis on question
of appearance by attorneys before tribal court in NTC Minutes, Oct. 17, 1958, at 335.
166. NTC Minutes, Oct. 16,1958, at 323-25.
167. NTC Minutes, Oct. 15,1958, at 257.
168. In a Sept. 18, 1958, radio address, Secretary of Interior Fred Seaton stated that, "no
Indian tribe or group should end its relationship with the Federal government unless such
tribe or group has clearly demonstrated, first, that it understands the plan under which
such a program would go forward, and, second, that the tribe or group affected concurs in
and supports the plan proposed." W. WASHBURN, THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND THE UNITED
STATES 996 (1973)
169. NTC Minutes, Oct. 15, 1958, at 257.
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college. He recognized that the Council might want to raise the
limit to twenty-seven, reflecting the possibility that a Navajo boy
would have attended college, law school, and received some
seasoning as an attorney by that time.'"
Davis also argued that an appointive system was then favored
as a state approach and would allow some ongoing measure of
authority over judges by the Council if the judges failed to do their
jobs. The judges were still not enforcing orders against debtors.
Davis concluded:
If merchants can't find any place where they can enforce a
debt against a Navajo Indian they are going to the State
Legislature and they are going to get the State Legislature to
extend its jurisdiction as sure as shooting. These merchants
have considerable influence with the State Legislature.'7
The present court of Indian Defense ( sic]) are working
pretty well as far as petty crimes are concerned, but in regard
to civil actions they are not working at all.'"
"Since the Lee case came up," added Davis, "the Tribal legal
staff has pretty well succeeded in keeping other traders from suing
Navajos in State Courts, but they have been doing that by saying
'If a Navajo owes you money go to tribal court'." Otherwise, the
courts where justice could be dispensed cheaply and justly would
be lost and replaced by state courts where justice was expensive
and where many Navajos who were not English-speaking would
be barred from juries.'73
Credit might be denied to Navajos. Davis read a letter from a
furniture dealer who sold on installment. When the dealer came to
tribal court, the defendant was not there. The judge said that he
could do nothing. Many other merchants had called the tribe's
legal aid attorneys with the same complaint.' After all, Davis
reminded them, all Navajos could not have a paid-for lawyer in
state court as had Paul Williams.""
The price of legal independence for councilmen and their com-
munities was set even higher by the reorganization plan and
Davis' argument. While Davis described no significant problem
with the courts handling the day-to-day complaints of Navajos, he
170. NTC Minutes, Oct. 14, 1958, at 248.
171. NTC Minutes, Oct. 15, 1958, at 258.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 257.
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argued that outside participants who criticized court operations
posed a threat to the system.17
Davis assumed that judges too independent of tribal court by
their lack of education or by their means of selection would not
act in the tribal interest against Navajo debtors or on behalf of
Anglo (or tribal) creditors.'"
Councilmen appeared to have been skeptical of this apparent
binding together of interests of individual Navajo defendants and
the tribe's need to proffer an independent judiciary for outside
creditors. One councilman inquired whether Navajos would be
able to have representation by attorneys in tribal court based on
their use outside."8 Davis responded that in light of their cost, it
would be better to bar attorneys.179 Davis added that to provide
counsel for a petty crime or for a civil case would be doing
something that most states do not do for indigent defendants."8
Yet Davis employed the state analogue again when he urged that a
1945 tribal resolution requiring jurors to be thirty years old be
lowered in order to obtain a cross-section of the community.'
Councilman Howard Sorrell pointed out that the age of police
had been raised from twenty-one to twenty-five at the Council's
urging.'8 ' The Council quickly adopted a motion to keep the
minimum age for judges at thirty-five years."
Several councilmen asked whether the reforms meant that
Navajos could not bring cases against non-Navajos. Davis
responded that the Indian Commissioner would never approve
such an attempt."' The Council asked if judges presently in power
would be retained on probationary status. The people would be
consulted by the chairman in judicial selection, replied-Davis."
Generally, the Council was overwhelmed by the changes prom-
ised, including, for example, rules of court and rules of evidence.
Frank Bradley said:
There are nine pages to this proposed resolution and I don't
understand a single thing in it. I don't know what was ex-
176. Id.
177. Id. See also NTC Minutes, Oct. 16, 1958, at 328, on removal of judges who failed
to live up to tribal interests.
178. NTC Minutes, Oct. 17,1958, at 334.
179. Id. at 335.
180. Id. at 337.
181. Id. at 334.
182. NTC Minutes, Oct. 15,1958, at 261.
183. By a vote of 46 to 17, id. at 262.
184. NTC Minutes, Oct. 16,1958, at 332.
185. NTC Minutes, Oct. 17, 1958, at 345.
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plained as we went through it. But the proposal here is to ap-
point tribal judges rather than to elect them, so I am asking
this question: Why are we making such a change? What is
wrong with the present judges that we have? What have they
committed or what have they done that we should appoint
new judges? ... I have no ill feeling against them, although I
may appear before them ever so often."
The next day Annie Waneuka argued for reform on behalf of
the tribal attorney and moved for the resolution's adoption.
"There is no proper control," she said, "and if we adopt this
resolution then we will have a better method of control. " "
Although the Council voted 61-1 to adopt the resolution, the
Secretary of Interior returned the resolution in January 1959, for
what an assistant tribal attorney explained were minor revisions.
"In our original resolution, we courteously requested the
Secretary to transfer his authority; in the revised resolution we
don't," he explained. "
The Supreme Court in Williams v. Lee had accepted the argu-
ment that Arizona courts had no jurisdiction over Navajos with
respect to any cause of action arising on the reservation. 9 The
Court rejected a much more conservative position argued by the
Solicitor General on behalf of the federal government that use of
its court or any court by traders was prohibited in any event by
federal regulations which made extension of credit at the risk of
traders.' The federal government had argued further that tribal
courts were what decisions of a hundred years before had called
them, merely educational and not really courts at all."
The Supreme Court chose to measure the tribal court's authen-
ticity independently of this narrow federal interpretation by view-
ing the institution as it then existed, as a component of a de facto
tribal law and order system. It requested and received a memoran-
dum from the tribal attorney listing all cases by traders then pend-
ing in the tribal court."
The Supreme Court cited glowing reports of the growth of the
Navajo law and order system in the Navajo Yearbook. The Court
136. Id. at 347.
137. Id. at 351. Councilman Denetstone expressed fear of the states getting jurisdiction
over the Navajo Reservation. According to Dillon Platero, fear of losing his election led to
a judge's failure to enforce collection of debts. Id. at 352-53.
188. NTC Minutes, Jan. 6, 1959, at 18.
139. Williams v. Lee, 385 U.S. 217 (1959).
190. Id., Brief of the United States Solicitor General, at 3.
191. Id. at 5.
192. Appeals record, Williams v. Lee, 385 U.S. 217 (1959).
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concluded: "The tribe itself in recent years greatly improved its
legal system through increased expenditures and better-trained
personnel. Today the Navajo Courts of Indian Offenses exercise
broad criminal and civil jurisdiction which covers suits by out-
siders against Indian defendants."193
This description of the law and order courts as a tribal legal
system indicated that the Supreme Court was prepared to view
tribal funding and tribal staffing as evidence of the tribal exercise
of its own sovereign authority and gave little or no weight to the
United States Solicitor's description of the court as an educational
vehicle of the federal government on the Navajo Reservation.
The tribe's political position in renewing its request for an in-
dependent legal system was strengthened. No longer did the tribe
need to consider a constitution as a mechanism for welding federal
and tribal authority.
The particular threat of state intervention to enforce debts in-
curred on the Navajo Reservation was dispatched by Williams v.
Lee."' The more general threat of Public Law 280 could be
eliminated by repassage of the resolutions to reform and fund the
courts, to assume and fund the police operation, and to adopt the
federal code of Indian offenses as the tribal code.
In the second Tribal Council deliberations of January 1959, the
tribal attorney presented a unilateral "compromise" on the ques-
tion of age. He amended the resolution to lower the age of judges
from thirty-five to thirty, arguing again that younger men receiv-
ing better educations could get appointments.19 When a coun-
cilman suggested that the tribal court system assert jurisdiction
over non-Navajos, assistant tribal attorney McPherson reiterated
the threat of Public Law 280.
I think it would be a mistake for this Council to undertake to
do the impossible and assume the authority to administer the
criminal laws with respect to non-Indians because the day
you do that the Congress will apply Public Law 280 to the
Navajo reservation. You wouldn't have any police force if
such is inflicted upon you by the States of Utah, Arizona,
and New Mexico. You will reach the point where you must
make the choice."'
However, from the perspective of tribal leadership, the threat
193. Id. at 222.
194. Id.
195. NTC Minutes, Jan. 9, 1959, at 21.
196. NTC Minutes, Jan. 6, 1959, at 20. The resolution passed 52 to 11. Id.
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of Public Law 280 was, by 1959, remote despite the fact that the
state intervention without tribal consent remained a statutory
possibility. The tribal chairman commented:
Whenever the state decides to take over, it will be up to the
people of the state to vote on it. That is 'their choice. But,
there are a lot of people in this state who say that they cannot
begin to do justice and that they haven't got personnel nor
the money to do it with. Meantime, we want to show them
that we have a law and order setup that is better than the
states and they won't want to interfere with that."'
The tribe continued to expand its police force, adding 22 new
positions to the force and increasing the budget by $400,000 to
over one million dollars.""
A newly appointed judicial advisor passed out copies of the
Canon of Ethics employed in Anglo courts, and spoke expansively
of education for judges and the use of a battery of achievement
tests to find candidates for newly vacant positions." More than a
few councilmen recognized that something other than the issue of
control was being addressed by these changes. One councilman
said:
Now the thinking is changing. Apparently we are going to
use highly-educated and highly-trained Navajos to handle
the Judgeships of the Tribe. What is the aim, what is the pur-
pose of such a thing? Are we going to change the language of
the Navajos altogether? I don't believe we are at that stage
yet. We would still like to use the Navajo way of thinking,
the Navajo manner of doing things, and use the Navajo
customs at this time, yet. The idea that we are going to
change all Navajo thinking, I don't believe stands well for the
Tribe.'
While Councilman Becenti's opinion did not change the vote on
the resolution for budgetary increases, he expressed the feeling of
Council members and community people who supported con-
tinued tenure for older and less educated judges. These tribal
views figured into the appointment of more educated but still
community-oriented tribal judges. No tests were administered."'
197. NTC Minutes, June 3,1959, at 435.
198. Id. at 405-406.
199. NTC Minutes, June 10, 1959, at 603-605.
2(0. Id. at 628.
201. Tribal Judge Tom Becenti, one of those selected, reports that candidates appeared
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Despite judicial education which encouraged judges to stand off
from their peers and not shake hands with clan members upon
entering the courtroom, an open style of free-flowing testimony
prevailed in tribal courts.' Cases which could iot be resolved in
local communities could find their way to tribal court under the
label of "disorderly conduct," and the judge.could probe the com-
plaint to discover the underlying problem.'
Members of the Tribal Council asked again that attorneys be
provided to assure protection of parties in court. The tribal at-
torneys did not support the introduction of lawyers into tribal
court.2 ' The reforms left the judge in a pivotal position to assess
the traditional or modern outlook of the Navajo party before the
judge.' Lawyers would add confusion with technical rules of
evidence and procedure that neither judges nor parties
understood.'
To believe that partial westernization of the legal process served
a constituency with traditional as well as modern expectations in
any predictable fashion was illusory. The system created was
neither Anglo nor traditional.'
An Assessment of the Decade
The Navajo "revolution" wag cautious and pragmatic. Had the
tribe not retained an able attorney who could read the political
and legal landscapes and had it not possessed resources to build a
legal system in a federal shell, the prospects for tribal sovereignty
would have been grim.'
Pragmatism made possible the introduction of Navajo lay ad-
vocates into the legal process in the 1960's and the professionaliza-
before the entire tribal council and spoke in Navajo and English prior to selection. Becenti
Interview, in VIcENTI, supra note 2, at 192.
202. Shepardson, supra note 16, at 250-53.
203. SHEPARDSON & HAMMOND, supra note 11, at 139 (145 of 436 cases were cast as
disorderly conduct).
204. NTC Minutes, June 10,1959, at 614-15.
205. See Becenti Interview, in VICENTI, supra note 2, at 216.
206. Id. at 191-92.
207. Id. at 182-85, for a critical assessment of tribal courts from the perspective of the
late Leonard Jimson, one of the finest lay advocates to appear in tribal court.
208. See, e.g., comments by the Mayor of Scottsdale, Ariz., against requiring tribal con-
sent prior to the assumption of state civil and criminal law: "Our opposition to the repeal of
Public Law 280 is based on the belief that it would in fact enslave them in a cocoon of
privilege- that of helping to make laws for others from the jurisdiction of which they could
choose to be excluded. How can we have people who vote for representatives to make laws,
who vote for judges, then determine whether or not those laws will apply to them, or have
those judges hear their cases. Such a proposal is so downright destructive of American prin-
ciples as to be indecent." VICENTI, supra note 2, at 131.
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tion of the system in the 1970's with a Navajo bar. Even if the
Navajo consumers of justice had been left behind or coerced into
subsidization of an Anglo-American legal system, what occurred
was ultimately for their own political good.'
The legal system, as a fixture of sovereignty, was equated with
tribal power but not with Navajo Indian power. Navajos who
questioned acts of the corporate tribe could not find judicial relief.
In this sense, the tribal legal system had replaced the Court of In-
dian Offenses as an improbable source of relief against acts done
in the name of the tribe as state. Jurisdiction could not be obtained
over non-Navajos, but non-Navajos could sue members of the
tribe. "10
The laws, both written and unwritten, that were applied in the
forum were federal and state laws. Custom was difficult to prove,
especially to high court judges advised by attorneys who knew lit-
tle or nothing about Navajo law ways as norms or processes of
dispute adjustment. Custom as law was favored by individual
judges but not by the system.21'
209. Judge Becenti saw both Anglo and Navajo law as pertinent to his court: "It is better
for us that we continue to include this custom law until the day all the Navajo people learn.
At that time, I do not know how it should be. Because the way the Navajos think about
each other, the way we think about each other, and the way the Pueblos think about each
other are different. And then, the way the Anglos think about each other is also a different
way. For that reason, for all ?f us to follow in that direction and set aside our customs, I do
not think that it would be right. They should be included and continued to be used. Perhaps
our way was better. This is the way they think about it ....
"According to my way of thinking, I think it's better to have both. Today the way of the
Anglo is good. The reason why I think that way is we have come to use and clothe
ourselves mostly with what is made by the Anglo. These are things which belong to him.
We have picked up some of these things today and are using them. Today, if our own bee
haz'.aanii became strong, that would be a good thing. It is like this within the Reservation
today. Some of those big companies and corporations look onto the Navajo Reservation
with a wish to come here, but it is not possible for them because of the law ....
"This is the way it seems to be. This is what they talk about mostly. But the thing is this.
'If we ever deal with the Navajos, there must be something by which everything can be
known."' VICENTI, supra note 2, at 216-17.
210. Navajo Tribal Code, tit. 7, § 63 (1962).
211. VICErrI, supra note 2: "The codification and enunciation of custom as law was
given lip service but not meaningful encouragement. Judicial advisors and tribal attorneys
instead retreated to encouragement of informality at states of litigation that the advisors
apparently thought would allow the tribal court to implement traditional Navajo ways,
concepts of harmonization that the advisors had heard about. Unfortunately, this in-
formality was usually at the expense of the defendant. It was made clear to judges that it
should not diminish their role as an authoritative figure." Id. at 182-83.
"It seems fair to say that Navajo leaders were badly advised in their wholesale acceptance
of Anglo-American common law. Clearly, they have not been shown the opportunities
available to them to change that substantive law to meet expectations of Navajo people that
were still relevant to them on a day-to-day basis. The theme enunciated at the judicial train-
ing sessions and the portrayal of white law as the law had clearly the contradictory effect of
convincing sincere and perceptive Navajo leaders that acceptance of Anglo-American
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Police and judges were not entirely new law jobs on the Navajo
Reservation. Yet in numbers and in organization they came to
have a pervasive impact on the people. Still, dispute settlement in
the communities screened out many complaints which might have
found their way to court in Anglo communities." '
In sum, the Navajo revolution allowed the internal legal events
of the sixties and seventies to take place. The motivations for this
structural change had both the opportunities and the conflicts
which emerged again when a federal legal services organization in-
troduced poverty lawyers and Navajo advocates in 1967. These
advocates represented interests of individual Navajos with little
avowed allegiance for protecting the political interests of the cor-
porate tribe at the same time."1 3
Writers attempting to describe the movement of societies from
informal social control mechanisms to structured legalities, as an
evolutionary product, will find little to comfort them in the
development of the Navajo legal system."
While the change traced above did parallel a transformation of
the Navajo economy from a land-based, sheep-herding economy
to one more dependent on credit and cash, the negative implica-
tions of this change for Navajo consumers were addressed only in
part by building a court and police system.
Liquor problems could be handled by the police. Family prob-
lems could be handled in court by judges who tempered their
Anglo law training with a Navajo propensity to hear the parties
out and then offer advice. Yet the purpose of many reforms was to
loosen practices based upon community loyalties, and to replace
them with a professional loyalty to the Navajo "state" and to a
legal procedure that validated tribal authority."'
The Navajo experience suggests that control of direction and
content of the legal process can be accomplished in several ways,
none of which are entirely determinative. First, one who pays and
supervises the players can also lay down basic definitions concern-
ing their roles and purpose. Second, new roles and new institu-
substantive law was a requisite to maintenance of Tribal independence from intrusion of
the state and federal systems. This is the portion of the termination policy that remains
most harmful and most pervasive." Id. at 184-85.
212. SHEPARDSON & HAMMOND, supra note 11, at 129-33.
213. See PRICE, supra note 15, at 177, for an account of the impact of individual
representation against the tribe on the director of the Navajo Legal Service program.
214. See Schwartz & Miller, supra note 3.
215. The parallel between the modem Navajo system and colonial legal systems is strik-
ing. See Bohannon, The Differing Realms of Law, in Nader (ed.) The Ethnography of Law,
67 AM. ANTHR. no. 6, pt. 2 (1965), at 33.
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tions carry with them new values which must at the very least be
addressed and integrated with other values or approaches that the
players might consider more appropriate. '16
The federal government, the tribal government, and tribal at-
torneys were able to lay down an organizational grid which im-
plied control from the center and from the top. They were able,
over time, to weed out more "rebellious" elements by requiring
education as a prerequisite to participation. Until recently, educa-
tion in an Indian context meant that a Navajo left the home com-
munity and lived within the paramilitary environment of a board-
ing school. The student not only learned a second language, but
was socialized to follow, at least in part, a different set of values."7
On the other side of the equation is the capacity of legal actors
to manipulate or adapt these original purposes with an eye to the
needs and demands of their second reference group, the Navajo
communities in which they resided. Consumers of the legal system
at the hogan level encouraged this countervailing process in
several ways.
Actors and consumers spoke and shared the same language and
legal culture. They shared a lifestyle with prospective law
specialists (and with Tribal Council members) that tribal attorneys
did not follow. Through their representatives they sought political
control of legal specialists. But as the criteria for selection of these
specialists effectively screened out many persons tied to local com-
munities, the consumers continued to apply pressure upon the
court by selecting for its adjustment disputes which seemed most
appropriate for resolution by police or by police and courts. '
To look for the institutionalization of custom in the norms,
roles, or procedures of the Navajo system or any other Native
American court and police system is a misguided search. The
pressures to conform in order to possess a state legal system were
too great to codify custom.""
Instead, the real conflict between westernization and tradition
took. place at a more fundamental level of daily activity by legal
actors. Professionalization and institutionalization meant west-
ernization. To possess the power of a judge or policeman while
playing the roles of judge or policeman lightly meant that it was
possible to form a loose compromise between the demands of the
216. VICENTI, supra note 2, at 183.
217. See MERIAM, supra note 25, at 346.
218. SHEPARDSON & HAMMOND, supra note 11, at 138-39.
219. VICENTI, supra note 2.
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state system and the demands of the communities in which the law
system performed.'m
Scholars who trace the role of law in society rarely utilize this
view of the process of law when they test it for "cultural
relevance," but look for "custom courts" or codes of custom as
evidence of custom's continuing impact."' They argue that when
governmental social control in the form of legal activity becomes
active in a community or state, its legal culture tends to drive into
oblivion less powerful forms of social control and, with them,
idiosyncratic approaches to dispute settlement.m
The byplay of custom and law seems to be more complex.
Custom survives outside of legal institutions in the society's design
for living, its culture. It presses inward upon the institutions by
means of cases brought there and by means of the daily activity of
legal actors attuned to custom. This was especially true when
Navajos had no trained attorneys or trained advocates who were
prepared to recast the complaints in terms of remedies available in
most Anglo courts.' The absence of advocates left to tribal judges
(and tribal court clerks) the task of recasting complaints to con-
form to Anglo law or to denying relief to customary problems
which could not be reshaped.'
The social distance between judges or police and their consti-
tuencies was not great. Social pressure to do what was right in a
community sense as well as in a professional sense was immense.
No other person or institution could be blamed for the acts of
judges and police in this context. This may explain the inaction by
judges when their only response would have been negative by
community standards.2m
The end result of professionalism in the Navajo society or
elsewhere was to develop a cadre of legal specialists who were
relatively immune from pressures by the consumers. They could
identify with their professional peers and with their profession
when their acts conflicted with their client's expectations.'
220. Manuelito and other Navajo headmen recognized this as early as 1883 when they
took jobs as police offered by the Indian agent. See VICEI, supra note 2, at 165-66 and
note 21, supra.
221. SeeT. WERHELST, SAFEGUARDING AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW (1968).
222. BLACK, supra note 2.
223. Judge Becenti remarks, 'Whenever there was something that did not seem right, it
was always disorderly conduct." VICE'TI, supra note 2, at 213.
224. Id. at 214.
225. See text accompanying notes 101, 145, supra.
226. This subject is often discussed in police literature. See L. RADEKET, THE POLICE AND
THE COMMUNITY 108 (1977).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1978
Although often cast by commentators as a battle for the minds
of the consumers of law, it appears, then, that the real battle over
content and control of Indian justice was for the minds of the legal
actors and not the consumers. The Navajos developed an Anglo
legal system in order to survive as a political entity. A centralist
tribal authority structure replaced a centralist federal authority
structure to keep the state legal actors out of the system. The con-
flict between law and custom was carried out in the background of
this reform. To the extent that legal specialists manifested cultural
diversity in their daily handling of disputes, the system manifested
diversity.
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